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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to integrate the findings of the studies related to the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in Asian countries. 
The second concern of the paper is to explore the moderating role of country-
specific characteristics on the pay-performance relationship in Asian markets. In 
order to achieve the study’s objective, meta-analysis technique is utilized through 
CMA. Basically, the results are analyzed with both the fixed effect and random 
effect models. however, the assumption of the fixed effect model regarding same 
true effect size was not fulfilled. Moreover, a higher level of heterogeneity was 
detected. Therefore, this study ignores the results denoted by the fixed effect model 
and follows the results prescribed by the random effect model. After eliminating 
outliers, the findings from 22 studies revealed that CEO compensation in Asian 
markets is aligned with firm performance but with the small magnitude. 
Furthermore, the results from the method of moments suggested that there is a 
positive effect of country’s development and literacy on the pay-performance link, 
however, the negative effect of gender inequality and Islamic practices are 
evaluated. Conversely, no significant effect of corruption on the pay-performance 
relationship is purported in the study. As the authors find the influence of country-
specific characteristics on the pay-performance relationship in Asian markets, this 
study confirms the need for enhancing pay-performance sensitivity in Asian markets 
to mitigate potential agency conflicts. 
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Introduction 
The recent financial crises have raised several condemnation 
regarding the ineffective corporate governance and biased 
compensation plans (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Spamann, 2010). By 
outlining theoretical boundaries, this discussion calls for more 
aboriginal research support to the prevailing knowledge on this 
domain (Meyer, 2006). It is a well-known phenomenon proposed by 
the shareholder’s view of the firm that the basic purpose of a firm and 
its managers should be to maximize shareholder’s wealth and stock 
market value (Jerzemowska, 2006). However, shareholders are 
characteristically dispersed and they do not handle their business 
operations personally. Thus, they hire agents (executives or managers) 
to operate the business function on their behalf, but it is possible that 
these executives could engage themselves in rent extraction and 
despite maximizing shareholders’ value, they seek personal benefits at 
the expense of shareholders’ wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Agency theorists have provided a rational explanation for the 
aforementioned issue that the interest of both the agent and principal 
should be aligned (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Executive 
compensation is a viable mechanism to resolve this issue if it is 
aligned with the firm performance, and eventually agency conflicts 
will be mitigated. Equity theory also proposed similar arguments that 
executives should be rewarded according to their contribution to the 
firm (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005). However, prior studies on pay-
performance relationship have provided mixed evidences especially in 
the Asian context (see Cheng & Firth, 2006; Fallatah, 2015; Feng & 
Johansson, 2017; Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Hall & Liebman, 1998; 
Hamid, 2016; Jaiswall & Bhattacharyya, 2016; Kato & Long, 2006; 
Murphy, 2002; Rahman, 2017). Therefore, it is important to evaluate 
the effect size and direction of these studies in order to provide better 
theoretical enlightenment to this context.  
The scholars from Asian countries have rarely published their work 
in renowned western journals (Leung, 2007), therefore, prior meta-
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analyses and systematic reviews regarding pay-performance 
mechanisms have not considered any Asian studies (Devers, Cannella, 
Reilly, & Yoder, 2007; Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000; 
Van Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2015). However, it is essential to 
investigate how Asian firms implement and design executive 
compensation mechanisms, because these firms are contributing 
effectively to recent economic recovery as well as global economic 
development (Peng, Bhagat, & Chang, 2010).  
To date, according to the researchers’ best knowledge, there is only 
one systematic review by Sun, Zhao and Yang (2010) who critically 
reviewed the executive compensation trends in the Asian market. 
Although Asian researchers have contributed in corporate governance, 
CEO compensation and pay-performance related studies (Cho, Huang, 
& Padmanabhan, 2014; Minhat & Abdullah, 2014; Peng, Sun, & 
Markόczy, 2015; Xiao, He, Lin, & Elkins, 2013), but this study is the 
first attempt to evaluate meta-analysis approach in the Asian 
perspective. In the presence of inconsistent results, meta-analysis 
studies provide more rigorous and systematic outcomes compared to a 
classical way of literature review (Hunter & Schmidt, 1990). 
This paper has also introduced certain country characteristics to 
examine their moderating influence on the pay-performance link in 
Asian markets. The arguments are developed by incorporating 
country-level rather than firm-level characteristics as Doidge, Karolyi 
and Stulz (2007) revealed that the former explain more of the variance 
in corporate governance than the latter, especially in the less 
developed countries. Good governance practices reduce the firm’s 
cost of funds as investors believe that the firm is well governed. 
Nevertheless, despite the firm’s effort to improve corporate 
governance mechanisms, if it is located in a country with poor 
economic development and poor investor protection, then the firm 
finds it expensive to grow additional funds. Therefore, country 
characteristics play a vital role in illustrating sustainable corporate 
governance practices. Consequently, prior literature tried to associate 
corporate governance mechanisms with political characteristics, 
financial system, religion, cultural heritage, economic development, 
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legal system and other country-level characteristics (Bushman & 
Smith, 2003; Hope, 2003; John & Kedia, 2004; PindadoQueiroz, & 
Torre, 2015; Stulz & Williamson, 2003).  
The purpose of this study is to dig deep into the academic empirical 
literature to illuminate the apprehension of the CEO pay-performance 
link in Asian capital markets. It is expected that the current study will 
contribute to existing body of knowledge by resolving uncertainty, 
improving estimates of the effect size and enhancing power over 
individual CEO pay-performance related Asian studies. Moreover, the 
magnitude with which compensation of CEOs in Asian capital 
markets is linked to firm performance is also evaluated. The study 
provides more significant insights due to cross-country analysis that is 
not possible when investigating a single economy, sector or a specific 
state.  
The second objective of the study is to assess how different country 
characteristics such as religion, development, corruption, gender 
inequality and literateness could influence the pay-performance 
relationship in an economy. For instance, Ellahie, Tahoun and Tuna 
(2017) argued that religious culture of economic incentives could 
shape individual’s preference regarding compensation. Norris and 
Inglehart (2011) posited that Muslims prefer variable pay for their 
individual efforts relative to Catholics and Protestants as Islamic 
teachings favor profit-sharing contracts. Similarly, the cross-country 
analysis of Greckhamer (2016) asserted that level of country’s 
development could influence CEO compensation, as more developed 
countries have a lower level of the worker-CEO pay gap. These 
countries culturally reject inequality and empower workers which 
eventually constrain excessive CEO pay. High adult literacy is also 
one of the important factors that could be associated with good 
governance practices in a country as Sudhir and Talukdar (2015) 
argued that educated nations are less likely to tolerate corruption and 
promote transparency in an economy.  
On the other hand, researchers found that corrupt environment is 
associated with weak corporate governance, corporate social 
irresponsibly and bribery culture (dela Rama, 2012; Keig, Brouthers, 
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& Marshall, 2015; Wu, Chandramohan, & Bali, 2016). More corrupt 
countries also suffer from weak investor protection, less efficient 
compensation structures and political institutionalization (Cumming, 
Fleming, Johan, & Najar, 2013). In like manner, gender inequality is 
also associated with weak pay-performance sensitivity (Albanesi, 
Olivetti, & Prados, 2015). This study further examines the reliability 
of these claims in Asian countries through meta-regression technique. 
In the light of the study’s evidence, policymakers could promote a 
strong legal environment through efficient compensation structures to 
foster economic growth.  
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Similar to the studies in Western economies, the pay-performance 
association in Asian context also seems to be the most studied domain. 
Various prior studies supported the agency theory while investigating 
the link between executive compensation and firm performance. For 
instance, Mengistae and Xu (2004) revealed a positive relationship 
between accounting-based performance and executive compensation 
by employing state-owned enterprises operating in China. In the same 
line, Kato and Long (2006) evaluated that executive compensation is 
linked to sales growth and shareholder value. The study by Cheng and 
Firth (2006) found an association of executive compensation with the 
operating performance but discovered no alignment with market-
based performance. On the other hand, Kato, Kim, and Lee (2007) 
found a significant relationship between stock market performance 
and executive compensation in Korean firms. Ghosh (2006) studied 
Indian firms and also found the association between firm’s current 
performance and CEO’s remuneration.  
The recent academic literature on the pay-performance link in Asia 
is also mixed and inconclusive. For instance, Sheikh and Shah (2016) 
found a positive association of accounting performance with CEO 
compensation but no significant relationship of compensation with 
stock market performance in the non-financial sector of Pakistan. On 
the other hand, Yahya and Ghazali (2015) found the positive 
relationship of CEO compensation with all accounting and market 
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performance indicators in the financial sector of Pakistan. However, 
some other studies did not evaluate any significant pay-performance 
relationship in the capital market of Pakistan (see Anjam, 2010; Iqbal, 
Khan, & Ali, 2012; Usman, Akhter, & Akhtar, 2015).  
In China, Conyon and He (2011) found a positive and significant 
link between firm performance and executive compensation. On the 
other hand, Paskelian, Bell and Omer (2012) found greater pay-
performance sensitivity in foreign and private owned firms as 
compared to state-owned firms. However, Feng and Johansson (2017) 
found a positive relationship between CEO incentives and firm 
performance in Chinese state-controlled firms. Yan (2015) also 
revealed the positive relationship of executive compensation and 
accounting-based performance. Cordeiro, He, Conyon, and Shaw 
(2013) purported that CEO compensation in China is weighted more 
heavily in term of accounting returns as compared to market returns. 
However, Zhou, Georgakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, and Vasileiou (2011) 
did not provide any evidence on the association between firm 
performance and executive remuneration in Chinese banks. Similar 
results were posited by Luo (2015) in the banking sector of China. 
Researchers also tried to investigate the pay-performance link in 
Indian firms. For instance, Raithatha and Komera (2016) found the 
presence of pay-performance link in larger firms of India. Ghosh 
(2010) also found the relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance with a smaller magnitude in the Indian capital market. 
Khanna (2016) also posited a positive association between firm 
performance and CEO compensation.  
The study by Unite, Sullivan, Brookman, Majadillas, and Taningco 
(2008) employed the firms of Philippines and purported a significant 
relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance. 
Ranging from weak positive to strong positive, Ismail, Yabai and 
Hahn (2014) found a significant relationship between CEO 
compensation and firm performance in Malaysian firms. Fallatah 
(2015) also noted a significant pay-performance relationship in Saudi 
Stock Market (Tadawul). Wahyuni (2014) found that CEO 
compensation was related to the past performance during global crises 
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in Indonesia. Along with many other determinants, Lee and Chen 
(2011) explored the positive association between CEO compensation 
and firm value in Taiwan stock market. Similarly, Rahman (2017) 
evaluated the positive relationship between firm performance and 
CEO compensation in Bangladesh. Owing to the fact that most of the 
Asian markets have improved their corporate governance mechanisms 
after financial crises, thus, this study is assuming the positive pay-
performance association consistent with agency perspective. 
Consequently, the discussion from prior and current academic 
literature leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: CEO compensation is positively aligned with firm performance 
in Asian countries.  
Organizations operating in Muslim countries need to follow a 
certain code of conducts described by Islamic Sharia. According to 
Sharia laws, these firms should rely more on the internal source of 
financing (shareholder’s equity) rather than debt financing (Fallatah & 
Dickens, 2012). For instance, Sharia laws in Saudi Arabia prohibit 
interest-based transactions but permit profit sharing and equity-based 
financing (Wood, 2007). Islamic principles prohibit Riba (interest), 
Gharar (hidden uncertainty) and Maysir (gambling) which distinguish 
Islamic finance from the classical financial system (Cattelan, 2009). 
Therefore, industrialists who believe in Islamic values may hesitate to 
obtain loans from conventional banks. Nonetheless, Ahn and Choi 
(2009) revealed that financial institutions are effective monitors and 
restrict the opportunistic behavior of managers. Thus, the role of board 
and strong corporate governance become more vigilant in case of 
equity-financing to protect the shareholders’ wealth (Hill, Lunn, 
Morrison, Mueller, & Robertson, 2015). In order to protect 
shareholders’ rights in these markets, CEO compensation should be 
aligned with the firm performance so that they will keep working in 
favor of shareholders’ interest. This is one possible explanation for the 
proposition that Islamic countries could have a higher pay-
performance relationship. 
Another viable description for the pay-performance relationship in 
Islamic countries is the sustainability of social or distributive justice in 
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Sharia Laws. In Islam, the employee must receive a fair wage for his 
input to get satisfactory output. According to Islamic guidelines, the 
employer will face God’s wrath if he do not compensate justly to the 
employee for his services. However, the employee should be paid 
according to the skills and the scope of work (Azman et al., 2014). 
Frumkin and Keating (2010) also argued that the compensation of 
religious CEOs differ substantively from the pay of their counterparts. 
As Islamic teachings indorse profit-sharing contractual arrangements, 
Norris and Inglehart (2011) revealed that Muslim employees prefer to 
receive variable compensation. Thus, it can be assumed that Islamic 
laws prefer equity compensation leading to stronger pay-performance 
link in Muslim countries. Therefore, this study formulated the 
hypothesis accordingly: 
H2: CEO pay-performance relationship is stronger in Asian 
Muslim countries as compared to Asian non-Muslim countries.  
Developed countries employ pay-performance models for cost 
savings and quality improvements (Richard, 2010). Well-developed 
markets have better corporate governance practices and higher 
separation of ownership and control. On the other hand, there are 
certain barriers for the efficient corporate governance in less-
developed or developing economies such as the lack of disclosure and 
transparency, weak monitoring systems, lack of adherence to the 
regulatory framework, lack of commitment on the part of board of 
directors, abuse of shareholders’ rights and weak enforcement 
mechanisms (Okpara, 2011). Nonetheless, developed countries have 
passed certain laws to restrict managers from benefiting their own 
interest at the expense of shareholders’ wealth. For instance, Correa 
and Lel (2016) argued that many developed economies have adopted 
say on pay (SoP) law which improves pay-performance sensitivity and 
reduces excessive CEO compensation. Similarly, using data of 54 
countries, Greckhamer (2016) found a lower level of worker-CEO pay 
gap and inequality in economically developed countries. Thus, it is 
assumed that more developed countries in Asia have embraced better 
corporate governance and they have aligned their CEO’s 
compensation with firm performance. Accordingly, following 
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hypothesis is formulated: 
H3: CEO pay-performance relationship is stronger in more 
developed Asian markets as compared to less developed Asian 
markets.   
Corruption is usually associated with various kinds of exploitive 
regimes characterized by non-transparent political systems and weak 
institutions. An earlier study by Hao and Johnston (1995) argued that 
higher level of corruption “have created incentives for people to 
enrich themselves, decentralization has given much more people the 
means with which to do so, and privatization has legitimized personal 
wealth”. Researchers also discussed that output and societal 
corruption depend on the interaction among the distribution of power, 
the societal compensation structure and productivity distribution 
(Subramanian & Chakrabarti, 2011).  
In order to reduce corruption, there should be an optimal level of 
compensation structure (a balance between over-compensation and 
underpayment). Over-compensation is also a type of organized crime 
and corruption (Ncube & Maunganidze, 2014). On the other hand, 
Feng and Johansson (2015) revealed that lower level of executive 
compensation could lead to higher level of corrupt practices. 
Therefore, the optimal level of compensation contract can be designed 
if CEO’s compensation is aligned with firm performance. In the 
presence of corrupt and fraudulent activities, there could be a lower 
level of pay-performance sensitivity (Feng & Johansson, 2015). In 
tandem to this argument, Cumming et al. (2013) purported that high 
level of corruption is associated with weak legal protection and less 
efficient compensation structures. Thus, it is supposed that there is a 
lower level of pay-performance relationship in the Asian countries 
with higher level of corruption. Consequently, following hypothesis is 
generated:  
H4: CEO pay-performance relationship is stronger in Asian 
countries with lower level of corruption as compared to the Asian 
countries with higher level of corruption.  
Despite the overall economic and social development in Asia, there 
are still challenges regarding traditional patriarchal culture, 
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demographic change, and global economic restructuring. Asian 
women are still facing tenacious restraints in attaining empowerment 
and gender equality. Some prominent issues are the lack of social 
protection, lower level of representation in decision-making or 
political positions, the prevalence of women in vulnerable 
employment, pervasive violence and issues related to health (Heyzer, 
2010). In the context of gender bias in executive pay, researchers 
demonstrate that female executives are compensated at lower levels 
than male executives (Muñoz–Bullón, 2010; Vieito & Khan, 2012).  
There are various studies which ensured that women representation 
on top management or board could positively influence corporate 
performance (Sabattini, 2007; Christiansen, Lin, Pereira, Topalova, & 
Turk, 2016; Dezsö & Ross, 2012; Khan & Vieito, 2013; Terjesen, 
Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015). Female executives in an organization are 
very important as they expend more efforts on firm’s operations, they 
have higher attendance rates and they develop more exhaustive 
decision-making process as compared to male executives (Troiano, 
2013). In developed countries, companies are required to have at least 
one-third representation of women on the board (Carter, D'Souza, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Randøy, Thomsen, & Oxelheim, 2006). 
Nonetheless, this policy is nonexistent in most of the Asian countries. 
Thus, in the presence of gender inequality, there could be a lower 
level of compensation for women and lower level of pay-performance 
sensitivity (Albanesi et al., 2015). Accordingly, following hypothesis 
is developed: 
H5: CEO pay-performance relationship is stronger in more gender-
equal Asian countries as compared to less gender-equal Asian 
countries.  
Literacy confers several benefits on nations, communities, families, 
and individuals. Especially, in the modern world, literacy is essential 
for participating actively or passively in global and local communities 
for enhancing personal empowerment, and fundamental to informed 
decision-making (Stromquist, 2005). Educated nations are better 
voters, they have the ability to complain effectively, these complaints 
put pressure on officials and eventually, the quality of government 
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could be enhanced (Botero, Ponce, & Shleifer, 2013). High literacy 
rate in a country can lead to superior corporate governance practices 
as aneducated nation promotes transparency and restrict corruption in 
an economy (Sudhir & Talukdar, 2015). Thus, it can be assumed that 
high literacy could lead to high accountability. In case of CEO 
compensation, more educated shareholders could put pressure on 
board of directors and CEOs enhancing transparency and 
accountability. Therefore, it is proposed that in the presence of more 
educated shareholders, the board of directors align their CEO’s 
compensation with firm performance in order to reduce agency 
conflicts. Consequently, following hypothesis is formulated: 
H6: CEO pay-performance relationship is stronger in more 
educated Asian countries as compared to less educated Asian 
countries.  
Meta-Analysis Procedure 
This study has followed the meta-analysis process defined by 
Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins and Rothstein (2009). According to 
Hunter and Schmidt (1990), narrative literature reviews could 
represent ambiguous results and concluding these studies are difficult 
because of variations in traits of individual studies such as time 
period, effect size or sample size. On the other hand, reaching a 
conclusion through meta-analysis technique is more viable, as it 
empirically incorporates the effect size of existing studies. The effect 
size (r) in meta-analysis indicates the magnitude between independent 
(e.g., firm performance) and the dependent variable (e.g., CEO 
compensation). This study has utilized correlation and sample size of 
the various studies in order to evaluate the effect size. However, in the 
absence of correlation, r statistics can be transformed from Mann-
Whitney test, Z-test or t statistics. Nonetheless, the investigator needs 
to go through several steps in order to corroborate a precise meta-
analysis.  
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
The main purpose of the study is to evaluate the overall pay-
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performance effect size in the Asian market, therefore, the studies 
relevant to this context were retained. There are certain assumptions 
of meta-analysis defined by Borenstein et al. (2009) that were verified 
before starting the process. This study has selected the researches in 
which the correlation between CEO pay and firm performance (ROA) 
relationship was mentioned, thereby the studies with quasi-
experimental nature or experimental studies were excluded from the 
sample size. Any specific type of organizational units were ignored 
due to the limited number of studies in Asian context. The study tried 
to consider both published and unpublished studies, however, there is 
a possibility that some unpublished works or studies with different 
language may have been overlooked (Borenstein et al., 2009). The 
studies with incomplete information and with different measures of 
firm performance were also excluded. In addition, the studies from the 
year 2010 were considered in inclusion criteria because Asian markets 
improve their corporate governance practices after recent financial 
crises (O'Dwyer, 2014). 
Literature Search 
In order to broaden the literature search criteria for the study, several 
social sciences and multidisciplinary databases were searched namely 
WorldWideScience, WorldCat, Web of Science, Ulrich's Periodicals 
Directory, SpringerLink, SSRN, Scopus, RePEc, NBER, Microsoft 
Academic Search, JSTOR, JournalSeek, Index Copernicus, Google 
Scholar, EconLit, DOAJ, ProQuest and EBSCO. Moreover, the 
literature was searched using various keywords such as CEO 
compensation, CEO pay, CEO remuneration, executive compensation, 
firm performance, ROA, accounting-based performance etcetera. 
Initially, almost 60 studies were selected but only 26 were retained on 
the basis of inclusion and exclusion criteria.  
Calculation of Effect Size 
The correlation coefficient is a strong intuitive indicator that serves 
the purpose of an effect size index if the correlation between two 
variables is reported in the study. The variance depends directly on the 
correlation, therefore, many meta-analysts do not perform syntheses 
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on correlation value. However, it is recommended by Borenstein et al. 
(2009) that correlation should be transformed using Fisher’s 
ztransformation and the summary value should be converted back to 
correlations. This study has not manually computed these syntheses as 
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (CMA) software was used for this 
purpose. Nonetheless, after outlier analysis, the studies with extreme 
values were eliminated. In the presence of extreme values, within-
group heterogeneity could be enhanced which could be an indicator of 
sample error (Brannick, Yang, & Cafri, 2011). The analysis indicated 
that 4 out of 26 studies were showing extreme values, thus, they were 
eliminated from the sample size.  
Measurement of the Variables 
CEO Compensation  
CEO compensation is the dependent variable in this study. The studies 
who measured CEO compensation with total annual remuneration 
paid to the CEOs were selected. Owing to the strong disclosure policy 
in developed countries, researchers have examined pay-performance 
link with different compensation packages in these capital markets 
(Tricker & Tricker, 2015). However, most of the domestic firms in 
Asian capital markets have not disclosed all the components of CEO 
compensation including grants, bonuses, stock options, prerequisites, 
deferred compensation etcetera. Therefore, majority of Asian 
researchers are constrained to collect data of only total CEO’s 
compensation to enhance their sample size.  
Firm Performance 
Firm performance is the independent variable of the study. Core, Guay 
and Rusticus (2006) argued that Return On Assets (ROA) is an 
effective measure of accounting-based performance. In Asian studies, 
most of the studies have also considered ROA to assess firm 
performance; very few studies have incorporated market-based 
performance measures. Therefore, the studies which assessed firm 
performance with ROA are taken under consideration.  
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Islamic Practices 
The first moderator is estimated as the dichotomous variable in order 
to ensure the effect of Islam practices on the pay-performance 
relationship, that is, 1= if Muslim majority country, 0 = otherwise. 
Almost 62 percent of Muslims live in the Asia-Pacific (Lipka, 2017) 
and majority of these Muslims are in favor of implementing Sharia 
laws especially on people with Muslim faith (Bell et al., 2013). Thus, 
it is believed that people living in Muslim majority countries could 
also prefer pay-setting process according to Islamic principles.  
Development 
The second moderator is employed to assess the effect of country 
development on the pay-performance relationship. Human Development 
Index (HDI) was considered to accomplish this purpose. Higher HDI 
score indicates that people have a decent standard of living, are more 
knowledgeable, and have better health facilities. Economic growth alone 
cannot reflect the development of a country (Noorbakhsh, 1998). Human 
development index (HDI) is a more sophisticated measure to assess the 
overall development of a country (Baker, 2011). 
Corruption 
The third moderating variable is corruption which is calculated 
through Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The index defines 
corruption as the exploitation of public power for personal benefits. 
CPI captures the informed views of experts, businesspeople and 
analysts around the world and rank countries by their perceived level 
of corruption. Higher CPI score indicates lower level of corruption 
(Melgar, Rossi, & Smith, 2010). 
Gender Inequality 
The fourth moderating variable is gender inequality which is 
measured through Gender Inequality Index (GII). This inequality 
index measures gender disparities in three significant components 
including economic status, empowerment and reproductive health. 
Higher level of GII scores indicates more gender inequalities between 
males and females (Permanyer, 2013).  
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Literacy 
The last moderating variable is literacy which is estimated by literacy 
rate. Literacy can be defined as the ability to read, write and use 
arithmetic.  
Finding and Discussion 
Initially, a basic meta-analysis is evaluated to assess the overall effect 
size on the relationship between firm performance and CEO 
compensation from 22 studies. The values were extracted from 
different Asian studies mainly conducted in Jordan, Pakistan, China, 
Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, India, Taiwan, and Indonesia. 
This study has estimated both fixed and random effects, however, the 
researchers needed to choose between them while presenting the 
results. The effect size estimated by fixed effect is 0.24 in Table 1, 
however, the random effect estimated slightly smaller effect size (r = 
0.21). In both cases, the effect size is small as Cohen (1962) purported 
that the effect size from 0.1 to 0.3 should be considered small. 
However, the p-value is significant (p < 0.05), therefore, it can be 
posited that despite of small magnitude, the CEO compensation is 
positively aligned with firm performance resulting in the acceptance 
of the first hypothesis.  
The fixed effect model assumes that all studies included in the 
sample reflect one true effect size. This model assigns weights to the 
subjects according to information provided, thereby, the small size 
study could be ignored and large size study with greater information 
could be given higher weight. In addition, fixed effect model deals 
with only one type of error (within study errors). For instance, the 
error tends toward zero in case of a large sample size of the study. On 
the other hand, random effects assume that true effect could vary from 
study to study. Each study in this model estimates different effect size 
and the weights are more balanced in random effects. Therefore, small 
studies are less likely to be underestimated and large studies are less 
likely to dominate in the random effect model (Borenstein et al., 
2009). Consequently, this study assumes that the random effect model 
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represents more precise estimates.  
Table 1. Meta-Analysis Results for Pay-Performance Relationship in Asia 






Abed et al. (2014) Jordan 0.05 -0.08 0.17 0.73 0.46 
Athar et al. (2012) Pakistan 0.02 -0.16 0.19 0.21 0.83 
Conyon & He (2011) China 0.13 0.11 0.16 10.06 0.00 




-0.02 -0.11 0.07 -0.40 0.69 
Feng & Johansson (2017) China 0.36 0.34 0.38 31.45 0.00 
Hamid (2016) Bangladesh 0.31 0.20 0.41 5.41 0.00 
Iqbal et al. (2016) Pakistan -0.05 -0.15 0.05 -0.96 0.34 
Ismail et al. (2014) Malaysia 0.34 0.26 0.42 8.00 0.00 
Jaiswall & Bhattacharyya 
(2016) 
India 0.23 0.20 0.26 16.63 0.00 
Khanna (2016) India 0.10 0.03 0.16 2.95 0.00 
Lee & Chen (2011)  Taiwan 0.22 0.18 0.26 10.26 0.00 
Lin et al. (2011) Taiwan 0.46 0.41 0.50 16.94 0.00 
Luo (2015)  China 0.02 -0.11 0.15 0.29 0.77 
Rahman (2017) Bangladesh 0.18 0.05 0.30 2.71 0.01 
Ramadan (2013) Jordan 0.26 0.20 0.32 7.90 0.00 
Riani et al. (2014) Indonesia 0.22 0.22 0.23 68.79 0.00 
Sheikh & Kareem (2015) Pakistan -0.32 -0.57 -0.02 -2.10 0.04 
Sheikh & Shah (2016)  Pakistan 0.31 0.26 0.35 12.38 0.00 
Sheikh et al. (2017) Pakistan 0.31 0.26 0.35 12.44 0.00 
Wahyuni (2014) Indonesia 0.24 0.07 0.39 2.73 0.01 
Yan (2015) China 0.29 0.28 0.31 36.46 0.00 
Fixed 0.24 0.23 0.24 89.01 0.00 
Rando
m       0.21 0.18 0.25 10.97 0.00 
In a meta-analysis, the test of heterogeneity also helps in choosing 
between fixed or random effect models. In case of higher 
heterogeneity, the random effect model is preferred. Table 2 
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demonstrates the statistics for heterogeneity. The Q-value represents 
the observed dispersion. If Q-value is equal to the degree of freedom 
(df), then it can be posited that all subjects share a common effect 
size. However, in the case of this study, Q-value (497.86) is much 
higher than df (21). Thus, random effect model is preferable in this 
case. Moreover, the p-value is less than 0.05 which further confirms 
the utilization of the random effect estimation. I-squared statistics 
denote that almost 96 percent of the observed variance between 
studies is due to the real difference in the effect size and just 4 percent 
of the observed variance could be based on random error. Tau-squared 
is also an important estimate in the meta-analysis as it is between 
studies variance that can be utilized in estimating weights. Fixed 
effect model assumes that Tau-squared is zero (Borenstein et al., 
2009). However, Table 2 shows that Tau-squared is not exactly zero, 
therefore, random effect is desirable to use in this scenario.  
Table 2. Test of Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity Tau-squared 
Q-value df P-value I-squared Tau Squared Standard Error Variance Tau 
497.86 21 0.000 95.782 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.081 
In order to conduct moderator analysis, meta-regression technique 
is utilized. Both method of moments and fixed effect models are 
illustrated in Table 3 to provide comparative insight. The results 
estimated by fixed effect model are all significant. According to the 
model, there is a positive effect of development and literacy on the 
pay-performance relationship, however, Islamic system, corruption 
perception index and gender inequality have a negative influence on 
the pay-performance association in Asia. Based on the results of fixed 
effect model, H2 and H4 cannot be accepted, but rest of the results are 
consistent with the proposed hypotheses. Results show that Islamic 
Asian countries have weaker CEO pay-performance relationship. As 
the higher level of corruption perception index (CPI) scores indicate 
lower level of corruption, thus, the negative coefficient indicates that 
there is a stronger CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the Asian 
countries with the higher level of corruption. On the other hand, the 
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results from the method of moments are different. The aforementioned 
debate argued that fixed effect model is not preferable in the presence 
of heterogeneity. Furthermore, the true effect cannot be same for all 
studies in this case, because these studies are conducted in different 
countries which have different country-specific characteristics. Thus, 
method of moments is a more preferable technique in this context.  
Table 3. Meta-Regression for Moderator Analysis 


































0 0.000 0.002 
0.00
1 0.045 
Fixed effect model could yield false positive results as it ignores 
between-study error. On the other hand, random effect’s method of 
moment considers both between-study and within-study variances 
(Chen, Manning, & Dupuis, 2012). Moreover, this study is not 
assuming that effect sizes are normally distributed, therefore, method 
of moment technique can be used (Borenstein et al., 2009). Owing to 
the smaller sample size, more strict assumptions may yield 
insignificant results. The findings of the study suggested that there is a 
borderline significant trend related to the effect of Islamic practices on 
pay-performance link (p < 0.1). Despite a little significant p-value, H2 
cannot be accepted as the point estimate shows negative statistic 
which means there is a lower level of pay-performance association in 
Muslim majority country. The study cannot confirm any effect of 
corruption on pay-performance relationship as we do not find 
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sufficient support to accept the H4 (p > 0.1). However, H3, H5, and H6 
are accepted as the p-values show significant statistics (p < 0.05).  
A strong pay-performance relationship was proposed in Muslim 
countries but the statistical evidence is vice versa. The results are 
contrary to the argument of Norris and Inglehart (2011) that Muslim 
employees prefer to receive variable compensation. There is a 
possibility that Islamic countries have not truly implemented Islamic 
laws in their industrial settings due to which the influence of religion 
on governmental decision and policy-making becomes ineffective 
(Lugo, Cooperman, Bell, O’Connell, & Stencel, 2013). Additionally, 
Majeed and Zainab (2017) also argued that Islamic financial 
institutions are not operating according to the true spirits of Sharia in 
Muslim majority countries. With respect to the country’s 
development, the results describe that more developed Asian countries 
have a better pay-performance relationship. It is factual that more 
developed countries adopt better corporate governance mechanisms as 
compared to less developed countries (Claessens, 2006). This 
evidence is also consistent with the study of Greckhamer (2016), that 
developed countries reject inequality and constrain unjust 
compensation practices.  
The results obtained from fixed effect model postulate that 
corruption perception index has a negative effect on the pay-
performance relationship. However, as this study is pursuing method 
of moment, therefore, this study considers that corruption plays no 
role in influencing pay-performance relationship in Asian countries. It 
cannot be confirmed statistically that higher level of corruption is 
associated with less efficient compensation practices as proposed by 
Cumming et al. (2013).  
The study also signifies that there is a weak pay-performance 
relationship in the presence of gender inequality. This result is 
consistent with the prior study conducted by Albanesi et al. (2015) 
that gender biasness reduces pay-performance sensitivity. Last but not 
the least, this study found a positive and significant effect of literacy 
on the pay-performance relationship. This result is consistent with the 
proposition of Sudhir and Talukdar (2015), that more education leads 
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to higher accountability, promotes transparency and restricts corrupt 
environment through which corporate governance practices in a 
country could be improved.  
Conclusions 
This study integrates the findings of prior studies pertaining to the 
relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in 
Asian countries through meta-analysis technique. This study gives 
grounds for random effect rather than fixed effect model due to the 
detection of heterogeneity in the model. The general meta-analysis 
results demonstrate that CEO compensation in Asia is aligned with 
firm performance but the magnitude is small. Furthermore, the 
moderator analysis through method of moments revealed that there is 
a positive and significant effect of country’s development and literacy 
while a negative effect of gender inequality and Islamic practices on 
the pay-performance relationship. On the other hand, results of meta-
regression indicate that there is no significant influence of corruption 
on pay-performance link.  
Although underexplored until now, this study could help Asian 
policymakers to foster economic growth by shaping superior corporate 
governance practices. It is confirmed that more developed countries 
have tighter CEO pay-performance link which reflects better corporate 
governance practices and high level of investor protection. Thus, 
investors may less likely face agency conflicts in more developed 
Asian countries. In order to attract foreign investments, Asian 
countries should strengthen their corporate governance structures 
especially through efficient compensation practices. Asian 
policymakers should also pay special attention to the adult and youth 
education to fight against corruption and improve transparency in the 
country. High level of literacy can be a source of regulating good 
corporate governance practices and mitigating the level of agency 
conflicts.  
On the other hand, managerial entrenchment effect is detected 
under gender inequality and Muslim majority. Consistent with the 
findings of the prior theoretical and empirical evidence, it can be 
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purported that gender inequality leads to inefficient pay-setting 
process and weak corporate governance. Some unchallenged Asian 
cultures of male dominance restrict equity compensation structures to 
reward males more than their female counterparts (Huynh, 2016). 
However, Asian countries should understand that females are 
contributing effectively in developing Western economies due to their 
consistency and exhaustive decision-making capability. Thus, women 
empowerment in Asian countries could benefit overall economy of the 
firm.  
It is very unfortunate that omnipresent corruption has corroded 
Muslim cultures and communities around the globe. Muslim majority 
countries are engaged in several corrupt practices and behaviors 
including breach of trust, stealing public property, exploiting rights of 
others through nepotism, selling fraudulent goods, laundering money, 
and ingesting bribery. In order to fortify this claim, Rehman and 
Askari (2010) self-declared Islamic countries are not truly practicing 
Islamic principles. The implementation of actual Islamic economic 
system could lead to a legitimate political authority, well-functioning 
markets, ethical business practices, absence of waste and hoarding, 
absence of corruption, equal opportunity and respect for human rights. 
It is suggested that Muslim majority countries should introduce 
flexible Sharia laws consistent with modern Western economic system 
to eradicate managerial entrenchment and corrupt practices from their 
country.  
The heterogeneity in the model is very high despite the 
incorporation of several country-specific moderators in the model. 
Therefore, future studies should also consider additional information 
and other moderators to enhance the model’s homogeneity. Although 
Valentine, Pigott and Rothstein (2010) argued that even two studies 
can be considered for meta-analysis, but it is believed that future 
studies should consider more published and unpublished studies to 
improve the reliability of effect size and to reduce any publication bias 
in this context. We have taken the values of moderators (macro-
economic factors) for the same year as the publication year of the 
articles but some of the values were not publicly available for the 
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recent years due to which last available data are considered. This is 
one of the limitations of the study which should be overcome by 
future studies. Furthermore, this study is limited to only accounting-
based performance measures, thus, effect size on the relationship 
between CEO compensation and market performance should also be 
investigated. According to Cochran and Wood (1984), accounting-
based measured performance can be manipulated by managers, 
therefore, CEO compensation should also be aligned with market 
performance to encourage long-term goal orientation and to reduce 
managerial myopic behavior.   
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